عنوان

Detecting Sybil Attacks Using Proofs of Work and Location for Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs)

Number

TLpq2231143868

.Language of Text, Soundtrack etc

انگلیسی

Title Proper

Detecting Sybil Attacks Using Proofs of Work and Location for Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs)

General Material Designation

[Thesis]

First Statement of Responsibility

Bewermeier, Niclas

Subsequent Statement of Responsibility

Mahmoud, Mohamed

Name of Publisher, Distributor, etc.

Tennessee Technological University

Date of Publication, Distribution, etc.

2019

Specific Material Designation and Extent of Item

98

Dissertation or thesis details and type of degree

M.S.

Body granting the degree

Tennessee Technological University

Text preceding or following the note

2019

Text of Note

Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) enable vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications that will pave the way to the next-generation Intelligent Transportation System (ITS). ITS aims to improve the road safety and reduce slow traffic and jams. To preserve driver's privacy, vehicles should use multiple pseudonyms instead of only one identity. However, malicious vehicles may exploit this abundance of pseudonyms and launch Sybil attacks by pretending to be multiple vehicles. Then, these Sybil (or fake) vehicles report false data, e.g., to create fake congestions or pollute the traffic management data. In this thesis, we propose a novel Sybil attack detection scheme using proofs of work and location. The idea is that each road side unit (RSU) is responsible for issuing a signed and time-stamped tag as a proof for the vehicle's anonymous location. Each vehicle should use the proofs sent from multiple RSUs to create an anonymous trajectory. The vehicle should send its trajectory to a traffic management center (TMC) which should use a matching technique to identify the trajectories sent from Sybil vehicles. The scheme depends on the fact that since the Sybil vehicles are bounded physically to one vehicle, their trajectories should overlap. We design the proof of location so that one RSU is not able to create trajectories for the vehicles, but the contributions of several RSUs are needed. By this way, our scheme can be secured against RSU compromise attacks. In addition, to limit the ability of attackers to create multiple trajectories for the Sybil vehicles, upon receiving the proof of location from an RSU, the vehicle also receives a computational puzzle to solve. The vehicles should solve the puzzle and provide the solution (proof of work) to the next RSU to obtain a proof of location. Our extensive simulations and experiments demonstrate that our scheme achieves high detection rate to Sybil attacks with low false negative and acceptable communication and computation overhead.

Computer Engineering

Computer science

Electrical engineering

Bewermeier, Niclas

Mahmoud, Mohamed

Electronic name

p

[Thesis]

276903

a

Y